Ruijie Zhang

Formula One is often discussed as a sporting spectacle, but under Liberty Media it is better understood as a financial asset. The key change has not been the racing itself, but the logic of value creation around it. In 2025, Formula 1 generated $3.9 billion of revenue, $632 million of operating income and $946 million of Adjusted OIBDA, all up strongly year on year (Liberty Media Corporation, 2026b). F1’s success under Liberty is therefore best understood not as a sporting story, but as a disciplined investment and monetisation strategy that improved long-term cash flows and asset value.   F1 is creating value because Liberty has expanded and monetised the business far beyond the race weekend itself. Liberty’s annual report shows that Formula 1’s primary revenue comes from race promotion, media rights and sponsorship, with many contracts involving advance payments and annual fee increases (Liberty Media Corporation, 2026a). That is exactly the kind of contracted cash flow profile i...

Ferrari is one of the clearest finance cases in modern luxury markets because it shows that shareholder value is not created by maximising sales volume, but by disciplined value management. Unlike a conventional carmaker, Ferrari does not chase scale for its own sake. It deliberately manages scarcity, product mix and client experience so that growth comes from pricing power, margins and durable cash flows rather than output alone. The 2025 numbers make the point: Ferrari shipped 13,640 cars, slightly fewer than in 2024, yet net revenues rose 7% to EUR 7.146 billion, EBIT rose 12% to EUR 2.11 billion and industrial free cash flow increased 50% to EUR 1.538 billion (Ferrari N.V., 2026a). In other words, less volume did not mean less value.   This is why Ferrari should be read as a value-creation case rather than simply a premium-brand success story. A volume-driven business can report higher sales while damaging margins or brand position. Ferrari’s model is almost the reverse. In the...

  Manchester United is often discussed as a football story, but it is more revealing as a case in corporate finance and governance. The club’s recent filings show a business that still generates elite-level revenue, reporting £666.5 million in FY2025, yet it also recorded a £33.0 million loss for the year (Manchester United plc, 2025). That tension matters. Manchester United shows how an ownership model built on leverage, concentrated control, and weak accountability can erode shareholder value over time. Even after Sir Jim Ratcliffe’s arrival and INEOS’s capital injection, the deeper question is not whether headlines have improved, but whether the club’s capital structure and governance logic have genuinely changed (Financial Times, 2024).   The destruction of value starts with legacy leverage. The Glazer takeover turned a globally admired sporting asset into a company that has had to manage around debt as well as performance. As of 31 December 2025, United still carried £315...